science, accounts of the work of professional scientists paint a picture dominated by the building and testing of models (Giere, 1988 (Giere, , 1999 Hestenes, 1992) . In these accounts, model building and testing are essential to the development of theory; models channel observations and drive the resulting interpretations (Hestenes, 1992) .
Central to the practice of sense making are tools, such as computers, that allow scientists and students to reify their conceptions of the world (Othun, 1995) . The physical nature of these models is especially important for science education. Ks Papert (1991) pointed out, such physical models are artifacts that capture students' conceptualization of natural phenomena. The reification of students' concepts is important; once reified, students' thoughts can stand as models of the phenomenon under investigation. In essence, then, physical models play a special role in educttion--they support sense making.
The physical nature of these models allows them to be objects to think with and to reflect upon. In essence, models have a role similar to that of thought experiments: They suggest ideas about where to look for critical components of emergent phenomena (Holland, 1998) . Moreover, the process of physical instantiation moves the model from the mind of the individual into a public forum where it can be discussed. This move from intrapersonal to interpersonal highlights the socially mediated side of science, a component that is often neglected in science classrooms.
In this chapter, I argue that engaging students in the socially mediated development and use of a particular type of physical model--explanatory models--should be a crucial component of science education. Specifically, I focus on three important ideas. The first is the role of building physical models in helping students improve their understanding of the natural world. The second idea is the importance of students designing their own representations in order to express and talk about phenomena in ways that are unbiased by the "finished" representations often characteristic of science education. Finally, I discuss the need for students to reflect on their own thinking and doing.
Crucial to student development of explanatory models are the tools that support the modeling process. Vygotsky (1978) pointed out that the tools we use shape our experience and, consequently, our thinking; conversely, our use of tools is shaped by the knowledge that we currently hold. In particular, I focus on a fi~rm of scientific practice--synthetic modeling--that is principally concerned with reproducing the phenomena of interest (Holland, 1998) as opposed to testing theories (which is perhaps the most common form of scientific activity found in U.S. classrooms). In short, in synthetic modeling, a modeler attempts to reproduce a phenomenon, typically by using computer-based tools, to specify the objects and relations that he or she thinks underlie that phenomenon.
Having briefly argued for the importance of synthetic modeling in science, I turn to considering programmable computational tools for supporting student development of such models. The argument will be made that such tools allow learners to use their current knowledge to define and construct their own models. For example, Papert (1980) describes how Logo has helped children build on their intuitive knowledge to generate a possible mechanism by which an insect might maneuver around an object blocking its path.
The present discussion is limited to research involving programs that school-aged students can learn relatively quickly without extensive training. This is not to suggest that professional programming languages, such as Lisp or C, are incompatible with a synthetic modeling approach. Learning these languages, however, typically requires considerable instruction and practice. This up-front cost makes such languages less suitable for quickly engaging school-aged children in model building than other languages, such as Logo. Since science is principally about sense making, it is important to begin by considering how knowledge is built as a result of sense-making activities.
KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION Conceptual Change
Research has long shown that students bring to the classroom descriptive and explanatory beliefs about scientific phenomena (Champagne, Klopfer, & Gunstone, 1982) . In this section, I argue that learning activities must begin by considering the role of students' current knowledge, how knowledge is constructed, and the role of activity in building knowledge.
Conceptual change is the branch of learning theory that deals with how people develop a functional understanding of complex, "difficult" ideas. In studying conceptual change, researchers are interested in how concepts are used and how their use changes over time. The following briefly outlines the two major positions on conceptual change and then considers the relation of these positions to science education.
The history of science provides the source for one position on conceptual change. Building on the work of Kuhn (1970) , this group of researchers (Carey, 1985 (Carey, , 1988 (Carey, , 1991 (Carey, , 1992 Hewson & Hewson, 1984; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Thagard, 1992) has presented conceptual change as essentially a restructuring of knowledge. Although there is some variation in the details different researchers include or exclude, Carey's articulation of this stance provides sufficient background for our purposes. Carey's (1985 Carey's ( , 1988 Carey's ( , 1991 Carey's ( , 1992 research exemplifies the influence of Kuhnian philosophy on the study of conceptual change. Carey has argued that there are two qualitatively different kinds of conceptual change: weak and strong. Weak change is essentially an enrichment process that involves such learning mechanisms as accretion and tuning. The net result is that, in weak restructuring, new relations between concepts develop. These new relations support the solution of new problems and often modify the ways in which old problems are dealt with.
According to Carey (1991) , weak restructuring is inadequate for explaining all developmental differences in conceptual understanding. She argued that there are cases in which the concepts as used in the two systems are so fundamentally different that weak change is insufficient to account for the move from one conceptual system to another. That is, the core concepts at the center of the two systems are not only incompatible, they are incommensurate. Consequently, in such cases, the new concepts can be acquired only through radical restructuring.
Carey's argument for radical restructuring relies heavily on examples taken from the history of science, such as the historical differentiation of heat and temperature (Wiser & Carey, 1983) . However, Carey's position also relies on data from studies of cognitive development. One aspect of the cognitive development literature that Carey cites is of special interest for this chapter: her work on ontological change. Carey (1985) claimed that children and adults differ in terms of die ontological distinctions they make. In many cases, the entities that children consider to be ontologically distinct are seen by adults as being fundamentally the same thing. For example, young children often act and talk as if physical objects, such as toy cars, and substances, such as water or air, are ontologically distinct. However, toy cars, air, and water are seen by adults as being the same type of thing; they are all made of physical materials.
Ontological distinctions are important because they are used by people to make inferences about their experiences (Carey, 1985; Chi, 1992; Chi, Slotta, & de Leeuw, 1994; Slotta & Chi, 1996; Thagard, 1992) . Specifically, members of a given ontological grouping all possess similar attributes. In this view, misconceptions--the systematic "wrong things" that learners often articulate when probed---occur when new concepts are assigned to the wrong ontology.
Consider the following example. A block of wood sitting on a table is given a push. It travels a short distance along the tabletop before coming to rest. To properly understand this phenomenon requires knowledge of the various forces at play in the system: the force of the block on the table and the equal and opposite force of the table on the block. However, when asked to describe why the wood block eventually comes to rest, many people do not describe the net outcome of the different forces acting on the object. Rather, they describe the result in terms suggestive of Aristotelian physics: The impetus inherent in the object has been dissipated. That is, people often will talk about force as an intensive property of the physical object--the block of wood--rather than processes acting upon the block. Chi (1992) contended that these types of arguments arise because laypeople often make ontological mistakes: They believe processes (e.g., heat, light, forces) to be types of materials. Consequently, many people often reason about these processes as if they have the qualities of material objects, as the preceding example illustrated.
In summary, the radical restructuring position on conceptual change holds that people's intuitive conceptions of the natural world are often at odds with current scientific understanding of phenomena. Moreover, the difference between the two views is not simply one of merely changing and/or developing new relationships while keeping the core concepts untouched (Carey, 1988) . For example, Chi (1992) argued that changing from a view of force as a material kind to one of process requires a "jump" from one ontological branch to another, a feat that cannot occur simply through building new relationships between existing concepts. Consequendy, researchers holding this position believe that a key goal in science education should be to help student.s restructure or replace their central conceptions of the world (Posner et al., 1982) .
There are, however, challenges to the notions that misconceptions arise as a result of incorrect ontological assignments and that conceptual development necessitates radical restructuring. This is not to deny that students' depictions of a given domain, such as physics, often differ from that of an expert (Chi, Feltovich, & G laser, 1981) . What is less clear is whether these differences necessitate replacing students' current conceptions with those of an expert.
DiSessa and his colleagues (diSessa & Sherin, 1998; Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993) have argued against the traditional cast of misconceptions as flawed knowledge representations. They claim that this construal is in opposition to the notion that all learning involves the interpretation of phenomena in light of a learner's existing knowledge. From this perspective, accounts of conceptual change that emphasize discontinuity--replacing one concept with another concept, or a quantum jump from one ontological branch to another--in learning are fundamentally at odds with a construal of learning as the process of adapting prior knowledge to fit new situations. However, as diSessa and Sherin point out, adopting this constructivist position appears to leave researchers and educators with a paradox that must be resolved: How can misconceptions, with their associated negative effects, also provide functionally useful knowledge that supports learning? Smith et al. (1993) argued that traditional accounts of misconceptions overemphasize discrepancies between student and expert scientists. This overemphasis arises as a result of a research focus that has centered on the products of student learning while largely ignoring the learning process. The result is a portrayal of students' prior knowledge as often interfering with learning, needing to be replaced, and resistant to instruction. However, as Smith et al. pointed out, learners' "misconceptions" are typically rooted in productive and effective knowledge that has proven useful in a wide range of situations.
An alternative to the argument that students' intuitive knowledge needs to be replaced is to consider how learners use their current understanding as they try to make sense of the world (Clement, 1982 (Clement, , 1989 diSessa, 1988 diSessa, , 1995b Minstrell, 1989; Smith et al., 1993) . Such a focus leads to considering which aspects of everyday knowledge can potentially serve as the foundation for rigorous theoretical concepts.
The following example illustrates how prior knowledge plays a role in the development of scientific knowledge. Clement (1989) showed a physics novice a diagram of a wheel on a steep slope and asked the student whether it would take more, less, or the same amount of force to push the wheel up the slope if one pushes at a point near the top of the wheel that is parallel to the hill or if one pushes at a point lower on the wheel but also parallel to the hill. The student was asked to think aloud while solving the problem. The key insight arose when the student made an analogy between the wheel and a lever. Specifically, he considered what would happen ifa lever was attached perpendicular to the hill. Recalling his past experience with levers, he claimed that it was easier to push on a lever the further away one pushed from the anchor point. Using this knowledge, he argued that the wheel and the lever were analogous; therefore, pushing at the top of the wheel would require less force to push the wheel up the hill. That is, the student used his prior experience and understanding of levers to help him think about the problem. This example illustrates how students can use their prior knowledge to reason about new situations. Prior knowledge provides ways of framing a problem based on experience. As Smith et al. (1993) pointed out, prior knowledge can provide new concepts by abstracting objects and processes from everyday experience. At the core, both novices and experts rely on contextually useful knowledge as they try to make sense of the world. Thus, Smith et al. argued , analyzing the commonalities between students and scientists can aid researchers in understanding how to help students make the transition from everyday knowledge to scientific thinking. The emphasis on contextual information is important; such knowledge is the foundation for all knowledge growth. Consequently, subsequent knowledge refinement and reorganization, not replacement, are key characteristics of learning from a constructivist point of view (Schoenfeld, Smith, & Arcavi, 1993; Smith et al., 1993) .
A focus on knowledge refinement highlights the continuity between novice and expert understanding within a given knowledge domain. Specifically, students' everyday thoughts are the foundation upon which scientific theory is built. Rather than being a source of errors, everyday thought provides a vast array of abstractions of physical experience. Such knowledge plays a similar role for both students and scientists--it supports conjecture and generalization. What distinguishes the scientist from the layperson is the rigor with which such abstractions are considered. As diSessa (1988) has pointed out, scientists use their everyday knowledge as the foundation for developing axioms about the world. In the process of axiomization, everyday thought is gradually reformulated to fit scientific standards of consistency, coherence, and completeness. Note that what is critical in the process of axiomization is not simply a change in knowledge content per se, but a change in the structure and systematicity of one's knowledge (diSessa, 1988) .
Students often use both expert (i.e., sophisticated and systematic) and intuitive (i.e., unsophisticated or unsystematic) conceptions within a single explanation (Clement, 1982; diSessa, 1988 diSessa, , 1993 . This juxtaposition of conceptual structures within a single explanation is difficult to reconcile with a replacement theory of conceptual change: Once replaced by the "correct" knowledge, students' intuitive conceptions should no longer exist. However, such findings are consistent with the view that learners do not so much lack content knowledge; rather, they often lack a commitment to the systematicity that characterizes scientific explanations and theories.
If, as diSessa (1988) argued, the transition from everyday to scientific thinking is primarily distinguished by a shift toward systematic thought, then an appropriate starting point for fostering systematic thought about the world is to consider the character of the knowledge that people spontaneously develop about the world. With this perspective in mind, Smith et al. (1993) proposed that science instruction needs to consider the following principles:
I. Expert and novice reasoning are both characterized by richness an(] generativity. 2. Advanced knowledge is psychologically and epistemologically continuous with prior states. Consequently, conceptual change can be characterized as knowledge refinement, not mere replacement.
3. Learning arises through attempts to explain some problematic aspect of one's world. 4. Emphasis should be on complex systems of knowledge that encompass numerous elements, not single units.
These principles imply that, rather than simply trying to replace students' intuitive concepts with those held by experts, science educators should be providing them with experiences that foster the examination and, subsequently, the refinement of their knowledge (Benson, 1989; Hammer, 1994 Hammer, , 1995 Schoenfeld, 1983; White & Frederiksen, 1998) .
What this framework does not provide is a depiction of how these principles might be put into practice. In the following section, I argue that implementing the points raised by Smith et al. (1993) requires considering two related aspects: the role of activities in supporting cognition and the types of tools that support the reification of students' intuitive ideas about the natural world.
Activity and Cognition
The prevalent view of cognition as solely a matter of mental activity is the legacy of Cartesian dualism. In the 17th century, Descartes proposed that the mind and behavior were two qualitatively different modes of life. He argued that each mode of life required its own unique methods of exploration, descriptive terms, and explanatory principles. The result of Cartesian dualism has been a belief that questions about knowledge represent an appropriate area of inquiry for students of the mind, not students of behavior (Scribner, 1985) .
In recent years, the view of cognition as solely a matter of mental activity has come under scrutiny (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Lave, 1988; Leont'ev, 1978 Leont'ev, , 1981 Scribner, 1985) . Subsequently, the goal of understanding human cognition has subtly shifted from focusing solely on mental activities to how people use knowledge in particular situations, what Scribner (1985) referred to as the functional nature of knowledge. As Lave (1990) pointed out, the functional approach to the study of cognition considers the cognitive system to include not only what is inside the head, but what is outside as well. A central claim of this stance is that knowledge develops in the context of purposeful activity. Consequently, if our primary goal is to help students examine and reflect upon their knowledge, we need to consider how knowledge emerges through the interaction of mental, social, and physical worlds.
Most activity typically occurs in a social context, within a community of practitioners (Lave & Wenger, 1991) . Newman, Griffin, and Cole (1989) argued that considering the social environment within which an activity occurs is a necessity for understanding and fostering cognitive change. That is, conceptual change is not just an intrapsychological phenomenon; rather, it is the result of shared activity in which interpsychological processes occur. Scribner (1985) described activities as a synthesis of mental and behavioral processes: "What you learn is bound up with what you have to do" (p. 203). In this depiction, one's knowledge guides actions; however, simultaneotLsly, goal-directed actions guide the selection of information for the task at hand. That is, there is a continuous interaction between thought and action. From this perspective, the starting point of all learning resides in the premise that the mind and body :ire extended and transformed by artifacts situated in activities (Davydov & Markova, 1983; Kuutti, 1996; Leont'ev, 1978 Leont'ev, , 1981 Nardi, 1996) . This suggests that understanding and fostering student learning goes beyond focusing solely on changes in mental structures.
Papert (1991) also argued for looking at the role of activities in conceptual development, In particular, he claimed that engaging students in the construction of personally meaningful artifacts is a particularly effective means for fostering the construction of new knowledge. The public nature of these artifacts serves an important role in the development of learners' understanding. As students reflect and discuss the construction of their artifacts, they potentially gain access into the evolution of their cognitive constructs (Newman et al., 1989) . Moreover, the effects are not unidirectional: Activity leads to the individual transforming the object; in turn, the properties of the object affect the cognitive status of the individual (Kuutti, 1996) .
The Logo computer environment nicely illustrates the manner in which tools and socially mediated activity interact to affect student understanding. A critical aspect of Logo is the turtle. Papert (1980) conceived of the Logo turtle as being an extension of a child's body (Papert, 1980) . Thus, in thinking about how to make the turtle move, children need only think about how they move through space. For example, the turtle can be programmed to move forward and backward, just as children can move forward or backward.
A common use of Logo is to introduce primary-aged schoolchildren to ideas of geometry and space. Young children can usually recognize simple shapes, such as squares, circles, and triangles. However, they are often unaware of the underlying structure that defines the different shapes. For example, when asked what qualities define a square, many first-grade children think that four connected sides are all that matter.
Logo provides a means for young children to reify their conceptions of physical space. In writing programs for making squares, circles, or triangles, they need to articulate the objects and relations that describe the shapes. For example, in generating a turtle program for forming a square, students need to specifically state how many sides are necessary, how long each side must be, and the relative orientation of adjacent sides. As students compare the output of their programs with exanlples of squares, points of congruence and incongruence are highlighted.
Students' programs not only capture their current thinking--what they consider important and unimportant in making a square--they also serve as public artifacts that can be analyzed, discussed, and reflected upon. In turn, these activities can serve to guide children in modifying and refining their Logo procedures. For example, after examining and discussing their programs for forming a square, many children notice that in successful programs the turtle simply repeats the same pattern four times. This insight can often be capitalized on to help students understand many common shapes as resulting from repetition of a common element. This use of Logo highlights a number of important points about the role of activity in knowledge building. First, learning begins with contextualized social activities that allow learners to use and share their current understanding. Second, science educators need to teach science in ways that assist students in building on their prior knowledge, that are experientially based, and that support the structural changes that characterize scientific knowledge (diSessa, 1987) . Finally, activity alone is insufficient for learning. It is when reflecting on activities situated within a community of learners that students have an opportunity to effect changes in their conceptual understanding.
In summary, socially mediated activity is central to developing the systematicity characteristic of scientific thought (diSessa, 1988 (diSessa, , 1995b Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer, & Scott, 1994; Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996; Jungck, 1991; Lave, 1990; Linn, 1990; Linn, diSessa, Pea, & Songer, 1994; Songer & Linn, 1991; White, 1993b) . Such activity supports the notion of knowledge-in-action, what diSessa (1995b) refers to as an enactive epistemology. However, we need to consider in more detail the nature of scientific activity that promotes such systematicity. The following section puts forth the argument that a key feature of science is the building, testing, evaluation, and refinement of models that capture objects and relations believed to undedie the phenomenon under investigation. A case will be made for the value of a particular modeling approach, the development of synthetic models, in science education.
FROM SCIENCE TO SCIENCE EDUCATION
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS, 1993) has stated that the nature of scientific inquiry often taught in school is fundamentally different from real-world scientific inquiry. As the AAAS pointed out, science is not just a set of semi-independent cognitive skills, such as hypothesis generation, experimental design, and hypothesis revision. Nor is science the mere collection of"facts" about a discipline. Rather, new research portrays science as the dynamic process of building and justifying explanations (Holland, 1998; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Penner & Klahr, 1996; Schauble, 1996) . This view is consistent with the idea of science education as building upon students' intuitive conceptions as a starting point in refining and systematizing their knowledge of the natural world.
A central means through which scientific explanations are developed is the construction, testing, and evaluation of models (Giere, 1988 (Giere, , 1999 Hestenes, 1992) . The approach to modeling used by practicing scientists has led to an interest in the use of model-based approaches in science education (Doerr, 1996; Linnet al., 1994; Penner, Giles, Lehrer, & Schauble, 1997; Webb, 1993) . Before describing how educators might engage students in scientific modeling, the nature of the modeling activity needs to be clarified.
What Is a Model?
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between two classes of models: physical and conceptual models. Physical models include all forms that have an external manifestation, be it a classroom planetarium or a computer model of a tornado. In contrast, conceptual models do not depend on concrete representations. Rather, they exist as concepts in the minds of humans (Webb, 1993) . Laws, such as Newton's law of gravitational attraction, and theories, such as the theory of plate tectonics, are both forms of conceptual models. Although both types of models are important, the focus of this chapter is on the special role that physical models, specifically computerbased models, can play in science education. Such types of models can help students think about natural phenomena by providing a means for the reification of their intuitive ideas. The resulting models are not only open to public inspection, they are objects to think about and with.
In addition to distinguishing between physical and conceptual models, Clement (1989) raised a further distinction in model types. Clement distinguished between two classes of models: expedient models and explanatory models. An expedient model may exhibit behavior similar to that of the phenomenon being modeled, but it does not provide any insight into the processes underlying the phenomenon's behavior. In contrast, the main role of explanatory models is to propose how a phenomenon arises. Clement (1989) argued that activities aimed at helping students develop explanatory models differ from traditional approaches to teaching science that focus on quantitative principles or hypothesis testing. Specifically, activities aimed at encouraging explanatory modeling emphasize learning by doing.
Modeling begins with a need to describe, predict, and/or explain some phenomenon. In designing explanatory models, students must use their current understanding to simplify the world by determining the objects and rules of interaction that they deem important. That is, observations of the natural world motivate the construction of models, in turn motivating further observations and driving the resulting interpretations. Once a model is built, it can be evaluated by comparing its behavior with the phenomenon under investigation. Depending on the outcome of the comparison, the model may or may not be modified. Moreover, the physical nature of these models allows them to serve as objects of discussion and reflection. Placing models in the public forum highlights the need for students to explain and justify their choices of objects and relations.
Opportunities to develop explanatory models rooted in personal experience are potentially powerful means for encouraging learners to think about the hidden processes--the causal relationships--that underlie natural phenomena. It is through the stipulation of possible mechanisms that models come to have explanatory power. This process captures an important quality of scientific models: They support the production of a simpler version of a phenomenon in order to focus one's investigation on particular features of the phenomenon (Osborne & Gilbert, 1980) .
Central to the development of a physical model is the specification of how model components are related. Gregg and Simon (1967) identified two benefits that result from having to make the objects and relations in one's model explicit. The first benefit comes from the need to explicitly state objects and relations, which forces the modeler to eliminate implicit assumptions. This requires the modeler to consider how he or she currently construes the phenomenon under investigation and how best to clearly represent the critical aspects that underlie it.
Second, the more precisely objects and relations are specified, the more unambiguous the interpretation of the subsequent model behavior. Since the ultimate end of modeling is a better understanding of the natural world, it is critical that a model's outcome be such that it can be easily compared with the phenomenon being studied. The degree of match between model performance and phenomenon provides feedback on the goodness of match between proposed objects and relations and the actual structure of the phenomenon.
Most models turn out to be partial explanations (Steed, 1992) . Models might include factors thought to be causal that, in reality, are only correlational. Although this might be perceived as a drawback, the partial specification of a model begins the process toward clarification of components and relationships.
The role of model evaluation is critical in modeling: Do the proposed objects and relations capture the phenomenon under investigation? As is common in scientific practice, model evaluation benefits from being conducted in a public forum in which students have to justify their design decisions. Invariably, discussion and subsequent reflection lead to model revision; in turn, this leads to further evaluation. Throughout this process, the focus is not primarily on whether or not a particular model is right or wrong; instead, the focus is on the degree to which model behavior can account for the phenomenon as currently construed. This focus on goodness of fit between model and phenomenon highlights the notion that science is an ongoing process in which what we know or believe is always open to question. Thus, as Doerr (1996) points out, a model is more than just a solution to a problem; it is an evolving tool.
To illustrate the modeling process, consider the behavior of an ant that manages to find its way out after being placed in a box with a small opening. Often in describing the behavior of the ant, people ascribe intentionality to the ant: It is trying to escape. That is, people tend to interpret the behavior of living organisms as purposeful (Resnick, 1994) . In actuality, the behavior of the ant can be captured using a model based on a random walk. We need not assume that the ant "knows" where the hole is located; in its random walk around the inside of the box, the ant stumbles into the exit. In fact, we need not ascribe any type of representational ability to the ant; it simply wanders around its environment, reacting to what it encounters.
It is quite easy to engage students in modeling the behavior of an ant in a box. For example, I asked a class of middle school students to spread themselves throughout the classroom and imagine themselves as ants. Using a coin as a randomization device, I had the students act according to the following rules:
1. Take a step forward. 2. If the coin flip comes up heads, turn right and take a step forward. 3. If the coin flip comes up tails, turn left and take a step forward.
Over time, a number of the students managed to "escape" from the classroom as their random walk took them out of the open door. Using this modeling activity as a reference point, students considered the need for the ant to know the position of the hole in order to leave the box. In discussing and explaining how they thought the activity produced antlike behavior, the students began to develop some understanding of the role of chance in producing behavior that, on the surface, might appear intentional.
Models are perhaps most often used in science for testing theories and making predictions (Giere, 1988) . However, there has been growing interest in a form of modeling often referred to as synthetic modeling. Synthetic models are of particular interest because this form of modeling is especially well suited for exploration via programmable computational media. The following describes the synthetic approach to scientific modeling.
Synthetic Models in Science
Synthetic modeling attempts to use artificial components, typically computer programs, to construct a model of a phenomenon from the bottom up (Ray, 1995) . The goal in the synthetic approach is not so much to test specific theories but to attempt to reproduce the functionality of the natural system under investigation. By stipulating objects and relations, synthetic models can act both as existence proofs--possible explanations of a phenomenon--and as exploratory tools (Holland, 1998) . Holland (1998) suggested that, as exploratory tools, synthetic models have a role similar to that of thought experiments in physics: They suggest ideas about where to look for critical components of complex phenomena. Moreover, since the models specify objects and relations, they can be modified to investigate the effects of varying system conditions.
The power of synthetic modeling in science education is nicely illustrated by contrasting two methods of studying a class of phenomena known as emergent systems. The following example will help clarify what is meant by an emergent system.
The "wave" is a common occurrence at many sporting events. Underlying the production of any specific wave is a simple rule that governs the interactions between the constituent components (i.e., people) that make up the phenomenon. The rule can be summed up as follows: If the individual next to you is in the process of sitting down, you stand up and then immediately sit down. That is, all any one person does is stand up and sit down. When a large number of people follow this rule, however, the perceived result is a "wave" that appears to travel around the arena.
This description of the wave highlights some ways of thinking (i.e., explanatory heuristics) that can help in coming to understand emergent systems (Resnick, 1994) . First, there is no singular or simple causal mechanism for the formation of a wave. There is no group leader directing or coordinating the actions of the group. True, there is a simple rule that people follow. However, the rule, in and of itself, is insufficient for producing a wave; it merely prescribes the behavior of any given individual. Second, the level at which attention is focused affects one's perception of the phenomenon. In considering the wave, at the micro-level all we see are individuals standing up and sitting down as specific conditions are met. That is, all that exists at this level are interactions between individuals. It is only when one steps outside of the system that the macro-level pattern, the wave in this case, is perceptible.
Third, as anyone who has observed the formation of a wave can attest, the rules, in and of themselves, are insufficient for guaranteeing the formation of a wave. For example, the number of individuals participating affects one's perception of the macrolevel pattern. Adding or removing individuals can greatly affect whether the wave will be perceived. If only a few people participate, the effect is not typically perceived as a wave; rather, the macro-level perception is of random individuals standing up and sitting down. Similarly, the timing of the interactions also affects whether the wave is perceived. If individuals stand up or sit down at the wrong time, the wave may fail to develop.
The AAAS (1993) has stated that engaging students in thinking about natural phenomena as the result of interactions within a system (i.e., as fundamentally emergent) should be a major focus in science education. Traditionally, dynamic systems have been modeled via differential or partial differential equations. Models based on differential equations are powerful tools for exploring dynamic phenomena; however, there are three drawbacks to such approaches.
First, there has been growing awareness that the level of interaction in most realworld systems makes such mathematical models intractable or britde (Doran & Gilbert, 1994; Sober, 1991; Wilensky, 1996) . Emmeche (1994) has argued that attempting to reproduce dynamic systems is the most effective means of determining their behavior.
Second, models based on calculus are typically beyond the mathematical capabilities of most high school, and even college, students. Consequently, having students explore, let alone develop, such models of natural phenomena is a difficult if not impossible task.
Finally, highly abstract mathematical models are far removed from students' everyday knowledge of the world (Frederiksen & White, 1992; White, 1993b) . For example, predator-prey models are typically modeled using sets of differential equations, such as the following Lotka-Volterra equations (Lotka, 1925; Volterra, 1926): dnl/dt = nl(b -kin2) and .
In these equations, b and drepresent the birth rate of the prey and the death rate of the predators, respectively; nt and n2 represent the population densities of the prey and predator, respectively; and kl and ks are constants. The global-level behavior of any predator-prey system is fully specified by these two equations (Doran & Gilbert, 1994; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Ray, 1995) . Moreover, the equations specify the changes in population densities over time for many different types of predators and prey.
The model just described is an effective tool for modeling many predator-prey interactions. However, this type of model is at odds with how students think about such interactions. Students typically do not think of predator and prey in terms of annual changes in population levels; rather, they think of predators and prey in terms of interactions between individuals, such as a rabbit being chased by a wolf. This difference in orientation can make it difficult for many students to see the relationship between sophisticated mathematical models and the phenomenon under investigation.
In contrast to the types of models exemplified by the Lotka-Volterra equations, the synthetic approach to dynamic systems emphasizes that system-wide behaviors arise through local interactions between system components. The goal of such modeling is to specify the initial micro-conditions that are sufficient to generate the macro-level behaviors of interest. That is, one starts with a set of system components and some behavioral primitives--rules--and synthesizes a complex system with the same functionality as the natural system (Mataric, 1993; Steels, 1995) .
To illustrate, consider how a synthetic modeling approach to predator-prey interactions might look. Modeling such a system would require specifying the constituent components, such as rabbits and wolves, and the behavioral rules that individuals would follow. For example, one would specify the rate at which individual wolves lost energy if they failed to eat in a given time period, the probability of a wolf successfully capturing a rabbit given that it came across one, and even the manner in which wolves explored their environment in search of prey.
In summary, science is a socially mediated activity aimed at building explanations. For science educators, a central goal is helping students move from their intuitive notions of the natural world to the systematicity that characterizes scientific practice. Central to this notion is the role of modeling: "We understand nature via our conceptions and the explanatory models we build with them" (Schwartz, 1995, p. 94) . Synthetic models can be especially effective tools for supporting students' construction of physical models. These models are then available for students to discuss, explain, and reflect upon.
Modeling provides a means for learners to experiment with their ideas about the structure of the world. Building, testing, and applying models highlights the links between model construction and conceptual development (Niedderer, Schecker, & Bethge, 1991) . Models are not just concrete examples; they are tools for analyzing and solving problems. Yet, science classes, in portraying science solely as data-driven discovery, ignore the importance of model building in the development, interpretation, or evaluation of explanations (Carey & Smith, 1995; Raghavan & Glaser, 1995) .
The problem for science education is attempting to find tools that support students' efforts to connect their perceptions and conceptions in the development of explanatory models. Webb (1993) has argued that computers are especially useful tools for modeling. Specifically, computer-based models must be executable; that is, such models can be "run" and the subsequent output compared with the behavior of a real system. Moreover, by varying the input values, one can test the model under a range of conditions and compare the results with the natural world. The following section argues that a particular type of computer environment--programmable computational media--is an especially valuable class of tool for engaging students in the buikling of synthetic explanatory models.
SIMULATION AND MODELING TOOLS
Computer-based cognitive tools are interactive knowledge construction tools that support human thinking, problem solving, and learning. (Orhun, 1995, p. 317) Physical explanatory models serve as external representations. As such, they are a part of the conceptual fabric of a scientist's thinking about a domain. Through the use of programmable media that support their invented representations, students can more easily give voice to how they actually think about the natural world rather than how they are supposed to think about it. Consequently, there is a need for tools that go beyond simply representing a domain (exploratory tools) to supporting and aiding students' ability to create and understand theories (expressive tools) (Bliss & Ogborn, 1989; Tinker & Thornton, 1992) . Resnick (1996b) echoed this point by stating that educational researchers need to develop frameworks from which interesting experiences are likely to emerge--experiences that support reflection and discussion. That is, when learners have the opportunity to instantiate their own models of a domain, they have the chance to consider the fit between the world and their representation of it. In this way, expressive tools support the view of science as active model building.
Computers, in and of themselves, do not effect change. Rather, the nature of the activities they support--the building of complex models affords learning that would otherwise often be impossible (Salomon, 1992) . Computer tools allow students to reify their thought processes via the construction of physical explanatory models of natural phenomena. The physical presence of these models supports their public examination and personal reflection (Kynigos, 1995; Vosniadou, 1992) . However, computer tools vary considerably in the forms of activity they support and, subsequently, in their potential for fostering students' learning.
A number of researchers (De Jong & van Joolingen, 1998; Eisenberg, 1995; Stratford, 1997) have distinguished among computer tools that run simulations, those that support model creation, and those that require the user to develop a model using a programming interface. Simulations include such commercial programs as SimCity (1989) in addition to a large number of domain-specific simulations, such as ThinkerTools in physics (White, 1993a (White, , 1993b ) and the Genetics Tool Kit (Jungck, 1991; Stewart, Hafner, Johnson, & Finkel, 1992) in biology (see De Jong & van Joolingen, 1998 , for a comprehensive overview of the use of simulation software in science education).
Simulations
Simulations are valuable tools for exploring domain-specific topics, such as Newtonian physics. For example, White (1993b) developed a series of microworld simulations that support students' thinking about such Newtonian concepts as force and motion. In each microworld, students are presented with a number of problem-solving activities and experiments that scaffold their discovery of the laws that govern the microworld. These simulations have proven to be powerful means for helping students develop sophisticated conceptual models of the forces that govern objects in motion.
Despite their utility and power, simulations are qualitatively different from general modeling tools. Simulations are characterized by the presence of an underlying, prespecified model that is not accessible to the student. In ThinkerTools (White, 1993b) , for example, students indicate the direction and magnitude of a force to be applied to a ball moving across a computer screen. However, students cannot access the computer code that specifies objects and relations within a given ThinkerTooi microworld. Thus, students are limited to manipulations that fall within the parameters of the user interface. The lack of accessibility to the underlying model (i.e., the program code) means that learners are unable to inspect, question, discuss, or modify the model underlying the simulation. Resnick (1994) has suggested that lack of accessibility to the underlying model is a major drawback to using prepackaged simulations. He argued that simulations therefore provide little insight into learners' initial conceptualizations of the phenomenon under investigation or how their conceptualizations may change over time. At the extreme, students might learn to manipulate the simulation interface without necessarily learning anything about the objects and relations that underlie the phenomenon of interest.
Icon-Based Modeling Programs
The second general class of programs does support the development of userspecified models. Typically, these programs allow users to build their own models via an icon-based interface. Examples of such programs include STELLA (Costanza, 1987; Mandinach, 1989; Schecker, 1993; Steed, 1992) and Model-It (Jackson, Stratford, Krajcik, & Soloway, 1996; Stratford, Krajcik, & Soloway, 1997) . Unlike simulations, which by their very nature are limited in scope, icon-based modeling offers a number of advantages for science education. First, the programs are domain general. Consequently, these programs, such as STELLA, are suitable for modeling a range of qualitatively distinct phenomena.
Second, such programming tools require users to specify and instantiate their conception of the phenomenon under study. Consequently, these programs are well suited for fostering individual exploration and explanation generation.
Finally, these modeling media are especially noteworthy for encouraging users to adopt a qualitative stance during model development (Schecker, 1993) . The importance of qualitative analysis in developing understanding is reflected in the results of expert-novice research. This research shows that experts, unlike novices, often first use a qualitative approach when solving problems (Chi et al., 1981) . Only after determining the general class of problem with which they are dealing do experts attempt a quantitative solution.
Adopting a qualitative stance can help students focus on the nature of the relationships between model components. For example, in STELLA, students build models by choosing from a set of icons that represent qualitatively different types of actions. Only after a qualitative model is built are the individual icons within that model assigned specific operational or algebraic expressions that quantify the specified relationships. The following example illustrates how an icon-based modeling program can help focus students' attention on attempting to explain the objects and relations they believe underlie the phenomenon being studied. Schecker (1993) described how high school students used STELLA in studying motion. A key goal in Shecker's study was to help the students come to understand that the same basic qualitative model can be used to explain a wide range of phenomena. Specifically, he wanted them to come to understand that a range of systems, from falling spheres to charged particles in a mass spectrometer, can be classified as cases of dynamic motion; therefore, all of these cases should be modeled with the same core set of explanatory principles. Differences among particular models reflect the specific forces acting in each case.
The particular scenario the students were attempting to model was the motion of a meteor entering the earth's atmosphere. To help students focus on qualitative aspects underlying forms of motion that initially appear dissimilar, Schecker first had them develop a model for a simpler case. Rather than first modeling the motion of a meteor, students attempted to model the motion of a parachutist. Once students had developed models of a parachutist, these models became public objects for the class to explore, inspect, discuss, evaluate, and revise. Schecker used the class discussions to focus students' attention on ways in which the motion of a parachutist and that of a meteor might be similar and different. Through the inspection and discussion of their models, students determined that the two situations shared a common underlying structure. Using their new understanding, students subsequently modified their parachutist models, keeping the common core principles, to develop their models of the meteor's motion.
Icon-based modeling languages, such as STELLA and Model-It, are compatible with a synthetic modeling approach. However, diSessa and Abelson (1986) pointed out that such programs, although powerful tools, have a significant drawback: They do not allow users full control of the medium. Consequently, these tools lack the degree of modifiability that defines programmable computational tools. A closer look at STELLA will clarify this point, STELLA was designed to minimize demands on a user's technical and mathematical skills (Costanza, 1987; Mandinach, 1989; Schecker, 1993; Steed, 1992) . By providing a student with a set of predefined symbols--icons--that represent important concepts in system dynamics thinking, STELLA limits the types of objects and relations that can be represented to the following types: (a) stocks (to represent things that build up over time), (b) flows (to allow the control of stocks), (c) converters (to generate outside influences and graphical relationships), and (d) connectors (to show the direction of proposed relationships in a system).
To build a model, the modeler drags and drops the icons he or she determines are relevant for the phenomenon being modeled. This creates a qualitative diagram of the dynamic system. After creating the qualitative diagram, the user must designate the logical and arithmetical connections among components. STELLA then automatically generates the simultaneous differential equations that underlie the model. This brief description of the modeling process in STELLA highlights a major drawback to using this tool as a means for engaging students in scientific modeling. Specifically, the icon-driven nature of the program requires users to adopt a particular way of thinking. In order to use STELLA, students must conceptualize a phenomenon in terms of the four types of icons available, regardless of their current understanding and ways of thinking of the phenomenon under investigation. If students do not construe phenomena in a manner compatible with STELLA's structure, it may be difficult for them to reify their current conceptions of the world.
Programmable Media
The final class of programs, programmable media, share with the icon-driven programs just described the ability to model a wide range of phenomena. However, in contrast to icon-based programs, programmable media do not limit the types of possible interactions. Rather, these types of programs require users to determine and specify the objects and types of relations they deem important in their model. Papert (1980) has long argued that programming provides a means for learners to engage with the deep ideas of mathematics and science via the building of explanatory models. Similarly, Ploger and Lay (1992) have claimed that programming is especially useful in science education because it requires students to be precise in defining and solving problems. Complete accessibility to a general programming language provides students with maximum flexibility to develop their ideas of natural phenomena as they build their models (De Jong & Njoo, 1992; Eisenberg, 1995; Kynigos, 1995; Mason, 1995) . In this way, students' beliefs become reified and open to reflection and critique. Thus, programming becomes a focus activity that supports moving learners beyond intuition and personal experience.
According to diSessa (1988, 1995 b) , the ability of programmable media to instantiate learners' experiences, in addition to engaging learners, makes it easier for them to learn the abstract principles underlying the phenomenon being studied. Resnick (1996a) echoed this point when he stated that simple observation and participation are insufficient for learning; rather, learners need a rich sense of engagement in which they have an opportunity to specify objects and relationships. In this fashion, programmable media can mediate between personal experience and scientific formalisms: Programming interjects intuitively accessible formalisms into an otherwise experiential microworld and thereby can help foster systematicity in the ways students view the world (diSessa, 1988) .
Engaging students in the use of programmable media has the potential to provide them with experiences that help support their reexperiencing of the world; developing models provides hooks for learners to hang their ideas upon (diSessa, 1987; Hoyles, 1995; Resnick, 1994 Resnick, , 1995 . That is, the authors just mentioned claim that modeling based on programming activities has the potential to engage learners in ways that require them to think about their perception of the world and to consider the possi-ble underlying mechanisms and relationships that could produce the phenomenon under investigation.
Programmable modeling languages not only offer a means of instantiating learners' ideas; they explicitly focus the user on thinking about the structure of the phenomenon under investigation. People can develop their understanding of the world around them by using tools that support activities focused on attempting to explain phenomena (diSessa, 1990; Wilensky, 1996) . Resnick (1994) provided an illustration of the power of programmable media to build on students' current understanding. He described two students developing models of traffic flow using the programmable medium StarLogo. The students began their modeling by programming obiects-----cars--and relations: (a) If there is a car close ahead of you, slow down, and (b) if there are no cars close ahead of you, speed up---unless you are already moving at the speed limit. The students stated that they thought these rules were sufficient for generating an uninterrupted flow of tralqqc. However, in testing their model, they found that traffic iams, in fact, quickly developed.
Initially, the students questioned the validity of their model. In their thinking, traffic jams arose as the result of some identifiable, extrinsic cause, such as radar traps, accidents, or road construction; that is, traffic jams do not happen without an identifiable cause. However, in thinking about and discussing their model, the students started to question their understanding of what the rules entailed. In order to explore their thinking, they implemented a series of modifications to their model. Through studying the effects of these program modifications, they came to realize that a key factor in determining whether a traffic jam formed was the spacing of the cars. Specifically, when cars were equally spaced, no traffic jams formed; however, when cars were placed randomly, as they typically are in the real world, traffic jams inevitably formed. Further reflection led the students to see that there was another contributing factor to the formation of a traffic jam: differences in the speeds at which cars moved.
This example illustrates the power of computational media to help students in developing their understanding of the world. Using the computational tool, the two students were able to reify their initial conceptions about the flow of traffic. They were then in a position to inspect, evaluate, reflect upon, and discuss the resulting model. The end result was a better understanding of the effects of chance on producing ordered patterns, such as traffic jams.
The use of programmable media for engaging students in developing their explanatory understanding of the world embodies two principles raised by BeUamy (1996) for evaluating educational technology. First, technology should support student engagement in authentic activities. In the case of science education, technology should allow students access to, and participation in, the development of scientific thought. As Scribner (1985) pointed out, "What you learn is bound up with what you have to do" (p. 203). Programmable media are tools that allow students to acknowledge and build on their prior knowledge, interests, and understood activity patterns.
The second principle Bellamy (1996) highlighted is the need for students to construct and share artifacts. Learning is not just the communication of facts from a teacher to a student; it is also the process of developing collective sense making. In other words, learners come to understand science when they are involved in the forms of practice that focus on sense making. Programmable media support the construction of physical explanatory models, an important type of artifact in science education.
In summary, programmable computational media can support learners in the transition from intuitive conceptions of the natural world to more systematic conceptions. Such modeling programs can serve as socially mediated tools through which students have an opportunity to reifiy their conceptions of the wodd. Students' physically instantiated models become public artifacts that can focus inspection and personal reflection within a community of learners. The following section reviews four programmable computational media that are conducive to student development of synthetic models.
PROGRAMMABLE MEDIA STUDIES IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
The research programs discussed in this section share a common heritage--they are all descendants of Logo (Papert, 1980) . As such, they attempt to incorporate Papert's vision of computational media as tools that allow learners to instantiate, observe, and evaluate their conceptions of the world. I begin by reviewing some of the research on using Logo. I then consider two offshoots of Logo, StarLogo and Boxer. I conclude this section by briefly discussing LEGO®/Logo, a package in which users build physical devices--robots--that they can then program using a version of the Logo programming language.
Logo
At the heart of Logo is the notion ofconstructionism: Learners are most likely to generate new ideas when they are actively involved in making an external artifact that attempts to embody their current thinking (Kafai & Resnick, 1996; Papert, 1991) . In the case of Logo, the external artifact is a computer program that can be reflected upon, as well as shared and discussed with others. In this way Logo becomes a construction tool that can support students' development, exploration, and growing understanding of new ideas.
The Logo interface was designed to capture people's common ways of thinking about the world (Papert, 1980) . For example, when talking about moving, people typically indicate direction by simple statements such as "forward," Logo adopts these common ways of talking by using similar conventions, such as FORWARD and BACKWARD, to control an icon known as the "turtle." This approach facilitates people's use of Logo by encouraging them to tap into their prior knowledge and ways of thinking when developing explanatory models.
In the approximately 20 years since Papert (1980) introduced a large number of educators to Logo, an extensive body of research investigating the use of the Logo programming language in classrooms has been established. A cursory search on ERIC using 'Logo' as a search term produced approximately 700 manuscripts since 1981. However, despite Papert's emphasis on Logo as a general tool to support students' thinking about a wide range of phenomena, very little of this research has focused on the use of the language as a modeling tool in science education. Of the approximately 250 Logo-based papers and conference presentations reported in the last decade, almost 90% focused on how the use of Logo affected the development of general problem-solving skills, critical thinking, collaborative learning, or metacognitive awareness. The remaining research mainly documented how learners develop and test ideas in mathematics, primarily geometry.
There have been a few studies that explore the power of Logo for modeling natural phenomena. One study in keeping with the focus of this chapter was reported by Kynigos (1995) . In this study, a group of high school students used Logo to model an electrically charged particle entering a magnetic field. Kynigos documented how students reified their conceptualization of the phenomenon in the process of developing their models. He argued that the nature of the programming tool helped the students to conceptualize and model the problem as two subproblems: constant velocity (the particle's momentum prior to entering the field) and constant circular motion (the field's influence on the particle). Students were able to use their understanding of programming structures to help them initially think about how to separate the problem into constituent components. Specifically, Logo's structure helped scaffold students' decomposition of the phenomenon.
In the Logo literature, Abelson and diSessa's (1980) text, Turtle Geometry, deserves special mention. This book primarily details the use of a Logo-like programming tool for exploring mathematical issues from plane geometry to topology. However, one section of the book provides an excellent example of the use of a programmable medium for developing explanatory models. Abelson and diSessa (1980) argued that there is a simple mapping between the turtle's limited repertoire of actions--FORWARD, BACK, RIGHT TURN, and LEFT TURN--and many cases of animal behavior, such as Simon's (1981) description of an ant wandering on a beach. Simon had argued that the convoluted path of an ant walking on a beach is not the result of any intentional action on the part of the ant. Rather, the path reflects the effect of the environment on behavior: The ant's path is the result of its response to interactions with the materials that compose the beach--sand, rocks, shells, and so forth.
The authors argued that Logo is a particularly useful tool for developing models of simple animal behavior. Logo provides a means for fostering students' thinking about animal behavior through the development of models that build on the primitives governing turtle movement.
To illustrate their argument, Abelson and diSessa (1980) detailed how Logo could be used to explore such issues as modeling an insect moving about inside a box. Many people have observed that such a trapped insect will spend most of its time wandering around the walls of the box. Often such behavior is interpreted as the insect having the goal to escape from the box: It is following the wall in order to discover an opening through which it can leave. However, as the authors showed, it is quite easy to model this behavior without assuming any top-level goal on the part of the insect.
The authors constructed a model in which the turtle simply wanders around the screen in a random walk. They then modified this random walk as follows: If the turtle became "stuck" (i.e., hit the boundary of the screen), it turned slightly until it could again move forward. These simple commands capture the behavior of an insect in a box without having to express any intention on the part of the insect to "escape" from the box. In fact, there is no need to assume any representational ability on the part of the insect. Rather, the behavior can be explained through the use of simple rules and feedback loops.
The preceding examples reflect the power of Logo to engage students in the development of explanatory models of natural phenomena. Moreover, the relative simplicity of the language suggests that it might be especially useful as a means for engaging young children in building such models.
Boxer
Boxer is an offshoot of Logo (diSessa & Abelson, 1986) . Boxer takes it name from the fact that all computational objects within the program are represented by boxes. Boxes can contain text, graphics, or other boxes. To enter any given box, one simply places the cursor within it. Entering a box allows the user to copy, modify, or delete the contents.
The box metaphor inherently fosters a more organized program structure than does Logo (Ploger & Lay, 1992) . Subprocedures can be easily developed by creating boxes within boxes. Moreover, the user can change the level of detail available by simply opening or closing boxes: Closing boxes provides a simplified global view; reopening boxes provides access to the underlying procedures. These properties of Boxer not only help students to manage complex systems and representations but add an important conceptual form, the notion of hierarchy, to students' expressive repertoire.
The central premise behind Boxer's educational use is that purposeful activity is a fundamental way of knowing (Lave, 1990; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Scribner, 1985) . Boxer embodies the notion that programming can be a powerful means for students to build on their current knowledge to create, explore, and modi .fy representations of the world. Moreover, Boxer implicitly supports the notion that a critical aspect of science is building ways of acting that foster the development of systematicity in one's thinking (diSessa, 1988 (diSessa, , 1992 .
Boxer has been used extensively for helping students develop explanatory models of natural phenomena. Researchers have used Boxer for helping students explore biological concepts such as glucose metabolism (Ploger, 1991 b) , the structure of molecules (Ploger & Lay, 1992) , and genetics (Pioger, 199 la) . Boxer has also been used with students to explore concepts in physics such as motion (Adams & diSessa, 1991; diSessa, 1995a; diSessa, Hammer, Sherin, & Kolpakowski, 1991) . To highlight the power of Boxer, I briefly describe two of the studies, one from physics and one from biology. In both cases, the need to explicitly represent objects and relations in devel-oping models with Boxer has two benefits. First, the programs provide insight into student thinking. Second, the programs are public artifacts that can be easily examined, discussed, and evaluated. DiSessa (1995a) described the use of Boxer by a group of sixth-grade children studying motion. Students were asked to create models that captured the motion of such things as a book being dropped or sliding to rest after being shoved along a table. The resulting simulations revealed considerable insight into students' conceptions about motion. For example, only one pair of students represented the central idea of changing speed in a falling object. They showed changing speed by having the program generate a series of dots to represent the object falling from the top to the bottom of the screen. In their model, an increase in speed was shown by the dots becoming progressively closer together as they moved toward the bottom of the screen. This representation appears to be in violation of current scientific understanding that objects increase in velocity as they fall; therefore, the distance covered for a standard unit of time should increase, not decrease, as the object falls.
The apparent problem with the students' model was resolved by looking at the code that underlay their representation and their explanations of their model. Rather than depicting time as remaining constant, as is typical in most scientific models of motion, the students chose to build on their intuitive understanding that things speed up as they fall. They did this by developing a model that explicitly reflected their understanding that one means of representing "more stuff" is to show more of what represents that "stuff." In this case, the students showed "more speed" by programming the model such that the falling object drew the dots with increasing frequency as it fell toward the bottom of the screen, a representation that made sense to them. By allowing the students the means to represent their ideas, Boxer supported their development of an explanatory model that reflected their conceptualization of the domain. Ploger and Lay (1992) used Boxer to investigate the effects of modeling on one high school student's understanding of biological functions. Specifically, the focus of this study was the development of representations for molecules, such as glucose, that play important roles in many biological functions. Understanding that these molecules have a common structure is critical to understanding their biological effects. Ploger and Lay were particularly interested in the ways in which the programming task helped the student to better understand molecular structure.
The first challenge with which this student was presented was to develop a model of a glucose molecule. The manner in which he developed his model provides insight into his initial understanding of molecular structure. Inspecting the student's program revealed that his model consisted of instructions that built a glucose molecule step by step. As a result, his program could produce glucose molecules but not other closely related molecules, such as galactose, that share a common structure.
Both glucose and galactose have 6 carbon, 12 hydrogen, and 6 oxygen atoms, albeit in different arrangements. However, they do share common subcomponents. For example, both molecules have hydroxyl groups in which oxygen is bonded to a hydrogen atom. Recognizing these common structures is a key to understanding the roles these molecules play in biological functions.
To focus the student on the limits of his representation, Ploger and Lay (1992) asked him how he might modify his program in order to represent the related galactose molecule. Since the student had used a piecemeal approach to constructing his glucose model, there was no easy means by which to modify the program in order to represent galactose. In struggling with how to model families of related molecules, not just individual molecules, the student began to focus on commonalities across the different molecules. The breakthrough in his understanding came when he recognized that both molecules could be broken down into common subcomponents, such as hydroxyl groups.
The recognition that similar molecules differed not in constituent components but in arrangement led the student to consider how the structure of the molecule could be related to the structure of his program. In thinking about the relationship between the molecule and his model, he came to propose that each of the molecule's subcomponents be represented as a separate subprocedure within a general model. Generating a representation for either molecule then simply required chaining together the subprocedures in an appropriate manner.
Over a period of 8 months, this student continued to use Boxer to revise his model. In so doing, he capitalized on the features of the program to improve the flexibility of his representation. For example, he eventually produced a representation in which atoms and their characteristics were explicitly represented. This last representation allowed the student to better understand the relationship between atoms and molecular structure. Specifically, the student moved from considering a molecule to be a collection of atoms to a conception in which molecules are defined as an arrangement of functional groups. This development is critical; it provides the basis for understanding similarities and differences not only in the structure of organic molecules but also in their functions.
Boxer's box metaphor in which subprocedures are represented :ts one box within another played a key role in the development of this student's thinking. Specifically, recognizing that subprocedures provided a means for representing common molecular subcomponents was instrumental in his developing a base model dlat could be easily modified to represent any one of a set of related molecules. In essence, the evolving structure of his program reflected his developing understanding of" the structure of organic molecules.
The student's program became a physical artifact that supported his further thinking in regard to molecular structure. Moreover, the model provided a focus for discussions with the researchers. These discussions, including the researchers' challenges, led the student to consider the match between model and phenomenon.
In summary, Boxer supported this student's thinking about molecular structure. A relatively simple task---represent a glucose molecule--led to an extended study of molecular structure in general. Through attempts to represent different organic molecules, the student came to understand that molecules are not just: random collec-tions of atoms; rather, a molecule has structure. Moreover, he came to see that there are classes of molecules that are related by virtue of similar structures.
The projects just described highlight the flexibility of Boxer to effectively model phenomena across a variety of domains. Moreover, the research reflects the manner in which tools interact with cognition to produce explanatory models that become objects of reflection and discussion. Resnick (1994 Resnick ( , 1995 Resnick ( , 1996a developed StarLogo to explore issues related to emergent systems, such as the wave described earlier. In constructing StarLogo, Resnick attempted to provide people with a tool that would support their developing understanding of a number of critical aspects of emergent systems, for example: (a) the fact that there may not be a singular causal force underlying a system, (b) the need to distinguish the micro-level interactions between system components from the resulting macro-level patterns or behaviors, and (c) comprehending that even small changes at the micro-level can have significant effects at the macro-level (Resnick, 1994) .
StarLogo
StarLogo bears many similarities to Logo, for example, its use of turtles. Moreover, the two programs share a number of primitives. However, StarLogo is able to do many things that are impossible in Logo. There are two major reasons for the increased power in StarLogo. First, StarLogo allows a user to have thousands of turtles acting simultaneously but independently. This facility allows the user to model phenomena involving interactions between entities with different qualities. For example, one could model the formation of water from its constituent components by defining two classes of turtles--one class representing hydrogen, the other class representing oxygen--each with characteristic properties. Modeling the formation of water would involve large numbers of each type of turtle interacting as specified in the underlying program.
Second, the background screen upon which the turtles move can be an active part of a model. In StarLogo, the screen is divided into approximately 10,000 "patches." Each patch is capable of holding and passing on information to turtles. This allows modelers to incorporate the environment in their models when appropriate. For example, we know that when ants find food, they lay down a pheromone trail that other ants can follow to the food source (Deneubourg, Aron, Goss, Pasteeis, & Duerinck, 1986) .
As the earlier description of the wave highlighted, central to understanding an emergent system is the ability to distinguish between micro-level interactions and the resulting macro-level patterns. This distinction is central to modeling in StarLogo.
In developing a StarLogo model, the user defines behaviors that govern individual turtles, all of which act independently of one another. Local interactions between individuals produce macro-level behaviors. However, nowhere in the program is the macro-level explicitly represented.
The emphasis in StarLogo on the individual entities that compose a system, rather than the aggregate, nicely ties into people's intuitive ways of thinking about many phenomena. For example, in thinking about predator-prey interactions, people do not typically consider yearly changes in population levels. Rather, they think about individual predators--be they wolves, sharks, or lions--attempting to capture and eat individual prey--be they rabbits, tuna, or gazelles. The power of StarLogo as a modeling tool is reflected in the following example in which Resnick (1994) described one high school student's explorations of possible mechanisms for how termites might build their nests.
Termite nests are amazing constructions. Nests in East Africa can be up to 20 feet in height above ground, with tunnels and chambers as deep as 32 feet below ground. Such nests may contain up to 5 million termites. Moreover, the nest is constructed such that an integral system of ventilation helps to regulate internal temperature and humidity. Outside air enters down-sloping shafts on the side of the nest; internal air is exhausted through shafts that exit at the crest of the nest. By varying the size of the outlets, termites can control the rate at which warm, moist air leaves the nest. The result is a constant--within +/-1 °F--nest temperature.
It is difficult to view a termite nest without wondering how such simple creatures can create such sophisticated artifacts. Resnick (1994) has suggested that when faced with complex artifacts, people tend to assume some form of centralized control. That is, they tend to believe that there is a central organization that develops, plans, and coordinates the construction of the artifact. In the case of many human constructions, such as cars, houses, and factories, this assumption of central control is appropriate. However, this is not the only means by which complex artifacts, or behaviors, can occl,r. Resnick (1994) reported that the subject of one study, as predicted, initially stated that there must be a head termite--the queen, most likely--that assigns work responsibilities to other termites. This belief that a complicated structure cannot be built without some sort of coordinator seems to arise from two sources. First, people often make an analogy between termite nests and the planned buildings humans construct (Penner, in press ). Second, people typically interpret the term queen to imply a leader who directs the actions of others. In reality, there is no central control directing the construction of the termite nest. Rather, it is through the simple local interactions among tens of thousands of termites that the nest structure emerges.
Clearly, modeling the construction of an actual termite nest would be a considerable challenge. Consequently, Resnick (1994) presented the student with a much simpler task: model the collection and piling of"wood chips." Resnick proposed the following rules to the student:
1. If you are not carrying a wood chip, and you bump into one, pick it up. 2. If you are carrying a wood chip, and you bump into another one, put the one you are carrying down on top of the other one.
Initially, the student was skepticS--as was Resnick--of the power of these two simple rules to lead to the aggregation of randomly scattered wood chips. She argued that termites could just pick up the chips that recently had been put down; therefore, piles would never grow.
Resnick and the student developed a simple model of termite behavior that embodied the preceding two rules, along with a random walk procedure that governed the termites' exploration of their environment. The results surprised both Resnick and the student: Over time the randomly scattered wood chips became aggregated into fewer and fewer piles.
The student's collaboratively constructed model served to focus her subsequent attempts to make sense of the connection between rules and phenomena. Through her reflection on the model and discussion with the researcher, she came to see that although chips could be added to or removed from existing piles, once a pile disappeared, it could never reappear. As a result, over time the number of piles slowly decreased until only a single pile remained.
This example highlights the critical role that a programmable medium can play in reifying a student's thoughts through socially mediated activity. Once reifled as a physical explanatory model, the student's thoughts became an object for discussion.
StarLogo is a potentially powerful tool for engaging students in modeling natural phenomena. To date, however, there have been only a few studies reporting on students' use of StarLogo (Resnick, 1994 (Resnick, , 1995 (Resnick, , 1996a Resnick & Wilensky, 1999) . Moreover, the overall focus of much of this research has been on helping learners develop a general understanding of emergent systems rather than the role of StarLogo in reifying students' conceptions of the natural world.
LEGO®/Logo
Researchers at MIT, in collaboration with the LEGO® company, have developed kits that use the Logo language to drive devices built from standard LEGO® bricks. The program interfaces with motors and a variety of sensors: light, touch, and angular rotation. Although not strictly a computational medium in the sense of Logo, Boxer, and StarLogo, LEGO®/Logo--and its most recent instantiation, Mindstorms®--does provide students with unique opportunities to explore some aspects of the natural world.
LEGO®/Logo embodies the three aspects of science education that have been emphasized throughout this chapter. First, it puts students in control of expressing their ideas. Second, it allows students to design and build their personal representations of phenomena. Finally, the concrete artifacts can help focus discussion and reflection within a community of learners.
Embedding computation in autonomous devices allows learners to construct artifacts that combine structure, mechanism, and behavior, for example, devices that follow a line or avoid a wall. As his colleagues (1993, 1996b; Hogg, Martin, & Resnick, 199 I) have pointed out, such creations raise important questions. For example, does following a line require that the line follower--human, insect, or inanimate object--have a mental representation for the line? Building a device that can follow a line requires the student to consider the relative roles of the environment, the physical makeup of the device (e.g., types of sensors), and the "program" in producing behavior. That is, working with LEGO®/Logo requires students to take their intuitive ideas of how behaviors are produced and make them explicit. Resnick and Ocko (1991) argued that LEGO®/Logo activities provide a meaningful context for students to think and talk about scientific concepts. They suggested that the concrete nature of LEGO®/Logo projects provides a focus for the progressive construction of rich scientific conceptions. Specifically, in constructing physical artifacts, students can experience scientific concepts in a variety of different but highly personalized contexts. In so doing, students have the opportunity to engage in the reexperiencing of their everyday activities, a process that diSessa (1987) argued is central to science learning.
LEGO®/Logo is a potentially powerful medium for exploring questions about living things from bacteria to humans. At present, however, it is a largely ignored resource; there has been very iitde published research conducted using any of the LEGO®/Logo products (but see Gorbunov, 1994; Lafer & Markert, 1994; Resnick, 1993 Resnick, , 1996b Resnick & Ocko, 1991) or the closely related Programmable Bricks (Sargent, Resnick, Martin, & Silverman, 1996) . Moreover, this literature largely consists of pointing out possible uses for these kits rather than the uses of the kits for engaging students in developing and thinking about explanatory models of natural phenomena.
CONCLUSIONS
We are concerncd not only with the "stuff" that students learn, but the process that they go through, and the recta-cognitive abstractions that they make from that experience. (diSessa, 1988. p. 69) A central premise of this chapter is that developing scientific understanding can be viewed as the appropriation of tools allowing students to build on their current knowledge while engaged in socially mediated activity. As Bruner and Haste (1987) argued, making sense of the world takes place in a setting in which social interaction, tools, and cognition shape learners' thinking and experience. The designers of the computational tools described here have taken seriously Papert's (I 980, 1991) charge of thinking of the learner as a builder. Implicit in the tools described in this chapter is the belief that programmable media objectify knowledge and processes that are often tacit (Crawford, 1995) . That is, such tools support the reification of students' intuitive knowledge of the world. Once reified, students' models are open to inspection, evaluation, personal reflection, and public discussion.
The use of programmable media in science education has the potential to provide insights into learners' thinking by fostering an approach that emphiLsizes the creation of, and reflection upon, models of the world. By engaging learners in synthetic modeling, we present science as something that is more than discovery or validation. In this way, the use of programmable media supports the view of scientific knowledge as constructed and mediated within a cultural environment.
Given the potential power of programmable media, it is somewhat surprising that there has been so little research on the use of such tools for helping students develop explanatory models of natural phenomena. One explanation for the dearth of research is probably the lack of consensus on whether students should learn to program (Soloway, 1993) . A common perception is that calls to teach programming are solely based on the premise that learning to program promotes the development of domain-general cognitive skills, such as planning. However, the underlying premise of this chapter has not been the potential for programmable media to promote improvements in broad mental functioning. Rather, the emphasis has been on the potential impact of using programmable media in helping students to build explanatory models in ways that are personally meaningful and engaging. Balacheff and Kaput (1997) have pointed out that the epistemological impact of learning to use such media is significant: Students gain the knowledge of a tool that supports their development of new ways of constructing meaning. This point has been echoed by Resnick and Papert (as cited in Soloway, 1993) . However, if students are to gain this benefit, they must be engaged in what Resnick and Papert refer to as "whole programming" activities: activities that engage students in programming as a means for exploring and expressing their ideas about the world.
Simulations and icon-based modeling programs have a role to play in science education. However, as diSessa (as cited in Soloway, 1993) has argued, scaffolded computer-aided design environments are only a partial solution. Such environments invariably place limits--often intolerable limits--on how and what students might build as models. In contrast, programmable environments provide students with the power to combine and modi~ programs that allow them to instantiate their current understanding.
In summary, lllich (1973) argued that we need tools that allow the individual "the greatest opportunity to enrich the environment with the fruits of his or her vision" (p. 21). The programmable modeling tools discussed in this chapter are cognitive tools that support students' knowledge construction by allowing them to instantiate their thought processes. The outcomes are explanatory physical models that can be examined, evaluated, discussed, and reflected upon.
